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Using the right transshipment policy is important when transshipments are exercised under demand uncertainty.
Optimal transshipment policy can be quite complex in a multi-ﬁrm system as optimal actions depend on all system
variables. Moreover, both how to select requested retailer and how to respond to requests are in question.
We introduce simple, close-to-optimal heuristic transshipment policies for multiple retailers. We ﬁrst show that
heuristic policies may perform even better than self-optimal policy, which is explained by Braess’s paradox. Then
we test the performances of various heuristics with respect to centrally optimal policy. When retailers can observe
others’ inventory levels, more effective transshipments can be made. Otherwise, a random selection performs quite
well. We also observe that although always-accept respond policy is quite close to centrally optimal in small
systems, the performance of pairwise-optimal holdback levels to respond requests is more clear and consistent for
larger systems.
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1. Introduction
The difﬁculty and importance of supply-demand match lead
both practitioners and researchers to investigate alternative
mitigation strategies to support the regular inventory manage-
ment decisions. One of these well-applied mitigation methods
is using transshipments, which is basically inventory sharing
among the same echelon players in a supply chain. Transship-
ments are observed at various supply chain levels and for
different product categories such as in retail level to satisfy
customer demand (Rudi et al, 2001; Özdemir et al, 2006),
among manufacturing facilities to satisfy spare part demand
(Kranenburg and van Houtum, 2009), and among suppliers to
swap commodity products (Kosansky and Schaefer, 2010).
In this study, without loss of generality (wlog), we call the
ﬁrms using transshipments as retailers. The main advantages of
transshipments compared with trades between supply chain
members in different echelons are shorter lead times, lower
transportation costs, and rebalancing of inventories to decrease
shortage and inventory costs simultaneously.
With the wider appreciation of transshipments in practice, the
questions on the more effective use of transshipments are
raised. The basic questions include, but not limited to, effects
of using transshipments on optimal stocking levels, when to
send transshipments and when not, how to share transshipment
proﬁts or how to dynamically negotiate for them, and how to
coordinate ordering levels of retailers that are using transship-
ments. However, most of these questions are studied on two-
retailer systems relying on the easier analytical tractability of
the systems compared with a multi-retailer system.
There are some aspects of the transshipment problems,
which are not existing in a two-retailer setting, but relevant
and crucial in a multi-retailer setting. First, in a two-retailer
system, transshipments are in question when there is only and
exactly one retailer with on-hand inventory, which is called the
sole requested retailer. Thus, the question of from whom to
ask for a transshipment is added as an additional decision in a
multi-retailer system. Second, it is shown in the literature that
the optimal transhipment sending decision between two-
retailers requires real-time information not only on sender and
receivers, but also on all members of a multi-retailer system,
which complicates the deﬁnition of the transshipment policy
(Archibald, 2007). Thus, both the optimal requesting and
transhipment respond decisions cannot be easily stated as a
closed-form policy when there are more than two retailers in the
systems.
Here we study easily implementable transshipment policies
for independently managed multi-retailer systems, which
will increase the expected proﬁts of retailers compared with
no-transshipment policy. We study a system, in which trans-
shipments exercised immediately after a customer arrival whose
demand cannot be satisﬁed at the originally visited retailer. We
consider the possibility of the overﬂow of the demand of this
customer to another retailer if a transshipment cannot be
obtained by the visited retailer. Such a setting helps us to model
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the transshipments that are highly close to those in practice as a
stocked-out retailer is allowed to do transshipment at different
points in time and with different retailers.
For this purpose, we introduce eight heuristic policies. Each
heuristic policy deﬁnes a heuristic transshipment requesting
retailer selection decision for the stocked-out retailer and a
transshipment respond policy for the requested retailer. The
selection of requested retailer is based mainly on the availability
of the real-time inventory state information in the system. If
the real-time inventory levels of the retailers are available, the
requested retailer can be selected among the retailers with
on-hand inventory as a function of the inventory levels. For
such a case, we introduce two different functions of inventory
levels for the requested retailer selection. If only the set of
retailers with on-hand inventory can be observed, but not the
inventory levels, then three different requested retailer selection
methods are introduced that do not account for the inventory
levels.
For the requested retailers, the decision of whether to accept/
reject a request, in other words respond policy, is handled by
two different heuristic policies. First, it is shown in the literature
(Archibald et al, 1997; Çömez et al, 2012b) that in a two-
retailer system, when transshipments are handled one by one
after each stock-out, then the optimal transshipment accept/
reject decision of a requested retailer can be deﬁned by optimal
holdback inventory levels. Thus, in each small time period
during a selling cycle, if the actual inventory level is greater
than the optimal holdback level of the period, the request is
accepted, otherwise, the request is rejected. Thus, a requested
retailer may be advised to not send a transshipment even if the
available inventory level is positive. Departing from these
results, we introduce a heuristic transshipment respond policy
for multi-retailer systems, where a requested retailer responds
to a request by using her pairwise optimal holdback level from
a two-retailer system that includes only herself and the request-
ing retailer. Second, we introduce a relatively simpler policy of
always accepting transshipment requests for a requested retailer
to benchmark against both the pairwise optimal holdback level-
based policy and also the extreme policy of no-transshipment.
In summary, by using ﬁve different requested retailer selection
heuristics and two respond heuristics, we introduce and test the
performance of eight heuristic transshipment policies.
We ﬁrst test the performance of one of the heuristic policies
with respect to (wrt) the solution in which each stocked-out
retailer makes his optimal requested retailer selection decision
and each requested retailer responds to a request optimally for
herself, which is called self-optimal transshipment policy. The
results show that using heuristic transshipment policy may even
lead to an increase in total proﬁts compared with the case where
each retailer uses his/her best policy. The dominance of the
heuristic policy over the self-optimal policy is surprising, but it
can be explained by ‘Braess’s Paradox’. When self-optimal
transshipment policies are used and resulting equilibrium order
levels are obtained, this equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto
efﬁcient, which means that at least one retailer can be better off
without anyone else being worse off. Thus, the inefﬁciency of
the equilibrium may result in decreases in total retail proﬁts. To
our knowledge, such an over efﬁciency of heuristic transship-
ment policies wrt the self-optimal policy within a multi-retailer
system is shown for the ﬁrst time in the literature.
Given that heuristic policy may perform better than self-
optimal policies, next we measure the performance of the
heuristic policies wrt the proﬁts obtained by using centrally
optimal transshipment policy. Besides, we also measure the
proﬁt losses due to no-sharing of inventories so that the proﬁt
gaps due to the use of heuristic policies can be better
appreciated. The heuristic performances are numerically tested
in systems including 3–10 retailers based on randomly gener-
ated problem parameters that follow car industry-based para-
meter distributions.
In the overall, the heuristic policies, in which the requested
retailer selection is a function of the inventory levels of other
retailers and the request respond is given according to pairwise
holdback levels, perform closer to the centrally optimal policy.
Although the policies using always-accept respond policy
perform fairly good for small systems, when the number of
retailers increases, they perform poorly. Because as each
available unit becomes more valuable in a larger system due to
a higher chance to send transshipment later in time, so holdback
level-based transshipment policies prove their performance in
these larger systems.
In this study, we also test the performance of random
selection of a requested retailer. The results indicate that while
the random selection is worse than the selection based on actual
inventory levels, it performs quite close to those that are using
partially observable inventory information such as salvage
values or demand rates of retailers with on-hand inventory.
In conclusion, we can claim that when the inventory levels of
all retailers are not fully observable, selecting the requested
retailer randomly and responding requests using pairwise
optimal holdback-levels result in fairly close proﬁts to the
centrally optimal policy. For example, for a 10-retailer system,
it results in around 2% proﬁt decrease, while not using trans-
shipments decreases the costs by more than 30% on average.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature and our contributions. The studied model
is explained in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the heuristic
policies investigated. The extensive numerical tests are reported
and their results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 provides
some concluding remarks. Details of some numerical analyses
can be found in the e-companion appendix.
2. Related literature and our contributions
Earliest studies on transshipments are Krishnan and Rao (1965)
and Gross (1963). In former, all transshipments are initiated by
the end of a season after all demand realization. So transship-
ments are allowed for all unsatisﬁed demand as much as the
overstock is enough to cover. In latter, the ordering from the
948 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 66, No. 6
manufacturer and transshipments, in other words, inventory
redistribution among retailers are done before the demands are
realized. Das (1975) extends the model of Gross (1963) by
allowing transshipment in the middle of each period for the
redistribution of inventories. In many follow-up studies with
similar one-time transshipment opportunity models, the trans-
shipments are analysed in terms of their effect on stocking
decisions either in centrally (Robinson, 1990; Tagaras and
Cohen, 1992) or decentrally managed settings (Hu et al, 2007;
Zhao and Atkins, 2009).
When the transshipments are considered before the total
demand realization, the right transshipment policy raises as a
question. Archibald et al (1997) analyse such transshipment
decisions for a two-retailer centralized system and prove that
optimal transshipment respond policy of the stocked-out retailer
can be explained by optimal holdback levels, which decrease
in time. In a similar model, except that unsatisﬁed demand can
be backordered but not lost, Çömez et al (2012a) show that
holdback levels increase during a replenishment cycle until the
next replenishment. Çömez et al (2012b) obtain the optimality
of holdback level-based transshipment policy in a decentralized
two-retailer system. Zhao et al (2008) study optimal production
and transshipment policies for centrally managed two-production
facilities that make one-for-one production.
When there are more than two ﬁrms to exercise transship-
ments, it is quite complicated to handle the transshipment
requesting and sending policies both in centralized as well as
decentralized systems. Thus, there are only studies considering
heuristic policies for in-season transshipment decisions. Using
a centrally managed model, Archibald (2007) introduces a
heuristic policy where the requested retailer is selected accord-
ing to descending transshipment price and the transshipment
requests are responded using pairwise optimal holdback levels.
In a similar setting, Archibald et al (2009) apply a decomposi-
tion method to split a multi-retailer system into two-retailer
systems and select the requested retailer according to the value
functions that are determined by the decomposition method.
Van Wijk et al (2012) analyze the transshipments among spare
part depots by assuming holdback levels at each depot to
respond to others’ requests. The aim of this study is to develop
a method to evaluate the approximate performance of the
system under random holdback levels.
Study of transshipment policies for decentrally managed
multi-retailer systems is quite scarce. Çömez et al (2012b)
introduce and test the performance of a heuristic transshipment
policy, in which the requested retailer is selected according to
highest ratio of inventory level to demand rate and pairwise
optimal holdback levels are used for responding. Huang and
Sošić (2010) work with a single season model of multiple
decentralized retailers. They consider that all transshipments are
handled by the end of the season, after all demand is realized
and assume complete sharing of residual inventories. The
decision of how to match overstocked and understocked
retailers is handled by some heuristics, which are tested by
using simulation.
One other stream of research on decentralized transshipment
systems investigates coordinating transshipment policies.
They aim to seek transshipment mechanisms that can lead
independent retailers to make system-optimal ordering deci-
sions from the supplier at the beginning of selling season. In
Anupindi et al (2001), transshipments are cooperatively made
at the end of the season and end-of-season proﬁt allocations
to coordinate orders are found. Extending this model, Sošić
(2006) considers partial sharing of inventories. Using a coop-
erative game framework, Huang and Sošić (2010) compare the
performances of proﬁt allocations and constant transshipment
prices to coordinate retailers’ decisions. Hu et al (2007) derive
conditions for the existence of coordinating transshipment
prices. Rong et al (2010) conclude that with the preventive
transshipments, there are no coordinating transshipment prices.
Hanany et al (2010) introduce a retailer-paid fund to subsidize
the cost of transshipments. Yan and Zhao (2011) propose a
mechanism to collect participation fees from retailers before the
season to subsidize end-of-season transshipments. Li et al
(2012) study a supplier-facilitated transshipment mechanism
to achieve coordination, in which retailers are offered to buy
more inventory or sell back excess in the middle of the selling
season.
This study contributes to the literature mainly by studying
various heuristic transshipment policies for multi-retailer sys-
tems with the objective of highlighting easy-to-implement
policies for independent retailers. Different than most of the
past studies, ﬁrst, transshipments are exercised one by one
individually for each stock-out, not at once after all demand
realization. Second, we show that interestingly heuristic policies
can perform better than the self-optimal heuristic policies,
which can be explained by Braess’s paradox. Third, we report
that when inventory level information of retailers are not fully
observable in the system, selecting the requested randomly
performs considerably well compared with a more educated
selection method relying on retailer characteristics. Fourth, our
numerical results are based on expected proﬁt calculation,
which include up to 10 retailers. Past studies mostly rely on
simulation when the number of retailers in the investigated
system exceeds 5.
3. Transshipment model for multiple retailers
We study a decentralized system of M retailers, who receive
inventory from a manufacturer at the beginning of a sales
season. Each retailer determines its order quantity at the
beginning of the sales season. Retailer i purchases Qi units
from the manufacturer, each costing c. We develop a discrete
time model by dividing the sales season into N short decision
periods such that transshipment per need can be studied. The
objective of each retailer i is to maximize his/her total expected
proﬁt, which is the expected operating proﬁt obtained through-
out the season from the sales Vi
N(Q) minus the cost of inventory
purchased cQi, where Q= (Q1,Q2,…,QM) is the vector of
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beginning of season inventory levels at all retailers. The
expected net proﬁt of retailer i is denoted as Ji(Q), which is
optimized as follows.
max
Qi
JiðQÞ ¼ VNi ðQÞ - cQi: (1)
It is clear that as the total expected proﬁt of each retailer
depends on the stocking levels of others, the solution to obtain
the initial stocking levels of retailers requires solving a game on
stocking levels.
The number of decision periods remaining until the end of
the sales season is denoted by n, 0⩽ n⩽N. The periods are
short enough so that there can be at most one unit demand
in each period; with probability pi at retailer i or at none of them
with probability p0, where ∑i= 0M pi= 1. As N increases by a
factor, and pi decreases by the same factor, the demand at
retailer i converges to independent Poisson process with mean
Npi. Time discretization is common in the literature to study
system responses to an individual customer demand, for
example, Talluri and van Ryzin (2004), Agrawal et al (2004),
Wee and Dada (2005), and Çömez et al (2012a).
Let xi denote the inventory level of retailer i in a period
during the season and x= (x1, x2,…, xM) be the vector of
inventory levels. Let P xð Þ denote the set of indices for
retailers with positive inventory levels, where jP xð Þj is the
number of retailers with positive inventory. In period n, if all
retailers have available on-hand (positive) inventory and if
retailer i receives a demand, he immediately satisﬁes his
demand and earns a unit sales price r. If retailer i does not
receive a customer demand, he has no cost or revenue.
Therefore, when all retailers have positive inventory, the
total expected operating proﬁt of retailer i in period n and all
remaining periods until the end of the season can be written
as follows, for i= {1,…,M}.
Vni ðxÞ ¼ p0Vn - 1i ðxÞ + pi½r +Vn - 1i ðx - eiÞ
+
XM
m¼1;m≠ i
pmV
n - 1
i ðx - emÞ; jPðxÞj ¼ M: ð2Þ
Above ei denotes a unit vector whose ith element is one while
all others are zero.
When all retailers are stocked-out (x= {0}), each received
demand is lost. With zero inventory in stock, there is no change
in a retailer’s operating proﬁt from period n to n− 1.
Vni ðxÞ ¼ Vn - 1i ðxÞ ¼    ¼ V0i ðxÞ ¼ 0; jPðxÞj ¼ 0: (3)
At the end of the sales season, if there is any left-over
inventory unsold at retailer i, it is sold at unit salvage price si to
obtain the proﬁt
V0i ðxÞ ¼ sixi: (4)
Transshipments may occur only when a retailer is
stocked-out. If retailer i has no inventory to satisfy his
demand (xi= 0) in period n, he (requesting retailer) sends a
transshipment request to another (requested) retailer to
transship a unit inventory. If the request is accepted, the
requested retailer charges transshipment price t to the
requesting retailer. No economies of scale are considered in
transshipment costs. Wlog, the cost of transportation τ is
paid by the requesting retailer. If the stocked-out retailer
cannot receive a transshipment to satisfy his waiting custo-
mer, the unsatisﬁed customer visits retailer m with
overﬂow probability θm. With probability 1 −∑m= 1, m≠iM θm,
the customer leaves the system of retailers without visiting
any other retailer. In fact, an unsatisﬁed customer of the
requesting retailer may visit several other retailers until she
ﬁnds a retailer with on-hand inventory, but because of
difﬁculty of tracking all possible customer overﬂows, here
we restrict the overﬂow of an unsatisﬁed customer to only
one retailer, who may be out of stock or has on-hand
inventory. In Section 5.3, we discuss this assumption further
and report numerical analyses on allowing a second request
option.
Let Rnmi be the indicator variable regarding whether retailer i
asks for a transshipment from retailer m. It takes a value of 1,
if a transshipment request is made to retailer m and 0 otherwise.
The response of the requested retailer m is also denoted by a
indicator variable called Anmi: Anmi takes a value of 1, if retailer
m accepts the transshipment request of retailer i and a unit is
sent from retailer m to retailer i. It takes value 0 otherwise.
Similarly, Anmi is the complementary variable such that
1 -Anmi ¼ Anmi: Then, the expected operating proﬁt of retailer i
when he is stocked-out is as follows.
Vni ðxÞ ¼ p0Vn- 1i ðxÞ +
X
m2PðxÞ
pmV
n - 1
i ðx - emÞ
+ pi
X
m2PðxÞ
Rnmi
"
Anmi r - t - τ +Vn - 1i ðx - emÞ
 
+Anmi
X
k2PðxÞ
θkV
n- 1
i ðx - ekÞ + 1 -
X
k2PðxÞ
θk
0
@
1
AVn - 1i xð Þ
2
4
3
5
3
5
+
X
j=2PðxÞ
j≠ i
pj
X
m2PðxÞ
Rnmj AnmjVn- 1i ðx - emÞ
2
4
2
4
+Anmj
X
k2PðxÞ
θkV
n- 1
i ðx - ekÞ + 1 -
X
k2PðxÞ
θk
0
@
1
AVn - 1i xð Þ
2
4
3
5
3
5
3
5;
i=2PðxÞ: ð5Þ
If jPðxÞj ¼ 0; (5) reduces to (3).
When retailer i has inventory on-hand, but there is at least
one other retailer, which is out of stock, then retailer i has a
chance to receive a revenue of t by sending a transshipment or r
950 Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 66, No. 6
by receiving an overﬂowed customer from a stocked-out
retailer.
Vni ðxÞ ¼ p0Vn - 1i ðxÞ +
X
m2PðxÞ
m≠ i
pmV
n - 1
i ðx - emÞ
+ pi r +Vn - 1i ðx - eiÞ
 
+
X
j=2PðxÞ
pj RnijAnij t +Vn - 1i x - eið Þ
 264
+
X
m2PðxÞ
m≠ i
RnmjAnmjVn - 1i x - emð Þ
+ RnijA
n
ij +
X
m2PðxÞ
m≠ i
RnmjA
n
mj
0
BB@
1
CCA θi r +Vn - 1i x - eið Þ 
0
BB@
+
X
k2PðxÞ
k≠ i
θkV
n - 1
i x - ekð Þ + 1 -
X
k2PðxÞ
θk
0
@
1
AVn - 1i xð Þ
1
CCA
3
775;
i2PðxÞ: ð6Þ
If jPðxÞj ¼ M; (6) reduces to (2). Note that both in (5)
and (6),
P
m2PðxÞ Rnmi ¼ 1; that is, the stocked-out retailer i
requests a transshipment from exactly one of the retailers with
on-hand inventory.
For a stocked-out retailer j, the proﬁt from satisfying a
demand with a transshipment from retailer i is r− t− τ. When
r− τ> t, receiving a transshipment is proﬁtable. When r− τ= t,
despite zero proﬁt of satisfying the demand at the requesting
retailer, the transshipment can be executed to increase the
customer service level. On the other hand, the requested retailer
i may send a transshipment to earn t or reject, expecting to sell
a unit to the overﬂowing customer at r with probability θi.
With probability θi ¼ 1 - θi; the unsatisﬁed customer does not
visit retailer i, then in the worst case, the unit inventory may be
kept on-hand until the end of the season and salvaged at si.
So retailer i does not accept any transshipment request if
t<θir + θisi: For transshipments to be feasible, parameters
should satisfy θir + θisi⩽r - τ for i∈ {1,…,M}. We assume
that all retailers know the parameters of other retailers, which is
similarly modelled in Rudi et al (2001) and Hu et al (2007).
When retailers use their self-optimal transshipment policies,
then stocked-out retailer j determines from whom to ask for a
transshipment, Rnij and the requested retailer i determines
whether to accept a request or not, Anij by maximizing their
respective expected proﬁts, for i, j∈ {1,…,M}, i≠j, i2PðxÞ;
and j=2PðxÞ: When the system inventory level is x, then the
requested retailer i determines Anij in period n as follows.
Anij ¼
1 if t +Vn - 1i ðx - eiÞ⩾θiðr +Vn - 1i ðx - eiÞÞ +
P
m2PðxÞ
m≠ i
θmVn - 1i ðx - emÞ + 1 -
P
m2PðxÞ
θm
 !
Vn - 1i ðxÞ;
0 otherwise:
8>>><
>>>:
(7)
Given the information symmetry in the system, then a
stocked-out retailer j determines from which retailer to request
a transhipment as follows.
Rnij ¼
1 if i ¼ arg max
m2PðxÞ
Anmjðr - t - τ +Vn - 1j ðx - emÞÞ
+Anmj
P
k2PðxÞ
θkVn- 1j ðx - ekÞ + 1 -
P
k2PðxÞ
θk
 !
Vn - 1j xð Þ
 !
;
0 otherwise:
8>>><
>>>:
(8)
For a two-retailer system,Rnij becomes irrelevant as there can
be only one other retailer to ask for a transshipment for the
stocked-out retailer. Çömez et al (2012a) show that in a two-
retailer system, a requested retailer’s optimal accept/reject
decision can be deﬁned by hold-back levels. For a requested
retailer there exists a single value of optimal hold-back level in
each period. Then the requested retailer accepts a transshipment
request in period n if his actual inventory level is greater than
his optimal hold-back level for the period. Otherwise, the
request is rejected. However, for a centralized system,
Archibald (2007) shows that when there are more than two
retailers in the system, the requested retailer’s optimal accept/
reject decision depends on his inventory level as well as the
inventory levels of the other (other than the requested retailer)
retailers. Thus, the optimal transshipment request response
decision cannot be deﬁned by simple hold-back level variables,
but can be complicated functions of the system inventory level.
In our multi-retailer decentralized transshipment system, we can
also show that both Rnij and Anij are in fact functions of
inventory levels x, so should more rigorously be denoted as
RnijðxÞ and AnijðxÞ:
Although the self-optimal requested retailer selection and
request accept/reject decisions of retailers cannot be deﬁned as
closed-form policies, the optimal expected proﬁts of retailers
and equilibrium stocking levels can be calculated numerically
for given parameter values. The pseudocode for calculating
expected proﬁts and equilibrium ordering levels under
self-optimal transshipment policies is provided in the online
companion. Although theoretically it is possible to make the
computation for systems with arbitrary number of retailers, the
computation time signiﬁcantly increases with the number of
retailers in the system. Because, as M increases, the number of
Rij and Aij to compute in each period n increases with the
second power of M. Second, to ﬁnd the equilibrium ordering
levels of retailers, for every possible pre-season order quantity
at every retailer, the expected payoffs at all retailers should be
computed. For an N-period problem, the maximum possible
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order quantity at a retailer can be N. Thus, for a single problem
instance, this leads to NM initial order quantity states, which is a
very large number for example for M= 10 retailers and N= 30
periods. Thus, it does not seem practical for each retailer to
analyse her self-optimal transshipment policy and ﬁnd equili-
brium order quantity. Therefore, in the following section, we
introduce various easy-to-implement heuristic transshipment
policies for independent retailers, some of which require real-
time information on the inventory states of other retailers, while
the rest can be used even under limited inventory information.
4. Approximate heuristic policies
In a transshipment process, there are two decisions that should
be made by the retailers. Retailer with stock-out should select
which retailer to request the transshipment from and the
requested retailer should decide whether to accept the transship-
ment request or not. Under self-optimal transshipment policy,
each stocked-out retailer makes the requested retailer selection
to optimize his own proﬁt, while assuming that a requested
retailer is also rational and would make her accept/reject
decision to maximize her own operating proﬁts. However this
policy is a computationally complex procedure and cannot be
executed in a short time either by a requested retailer or a
requested one without using computers. To encourage the use
of transshipments to beneﬁt both the stocked-out retailers and
retailers with on-hand inventory, it would be beneﬁcial to
introduce policies that can be determined in-advance of trans-
shipments, so that they can be quickly utilized when needed.
We introduce and investigate the performance of heuristic
policies both to select the requested retailer and also to accept/
reject requests for the requested retailer. For the requested
retailer’s accept/reject decision, we introduce two heuristic
policies. First is based on the optimal policy for a two-retailer
system. In a two-retailer system, AnijðxÞ deﬁned in (7) can be
simpliﬁed such that
Anij ¼
1 if xi>~xni ;
0 otherwise:
(
Here ~xni is the optimal holdback level for retailer i in period n,
which can be obtained as ~xni :¼ maxfxi⩾0 : t - θir<
ð1 - θiÞðVn - 1i ðxÞ -Vn - 1i ðx - eiÞÞg: Thus, if the other retailer
asks for a transshipment from retailer i in period n, then retailer
i accepts the request if her current inventory level xi is greater
than her holdback level (xi>~xni ). Otherwise, retailer i rejects
the request. Optimal holdback levels ~xni can be computed
in-advance by considering the expected operating proﬁt func-
tions and can be used during a season when the actual
transshipment request is received and by comparing with the
actual inventory level of the requested retailer. Thus, in a
two-retailer system, N optimal holdback levels are enough
to deﬁne the self-optimal accept/reject policy of a retailer.
Departing from this simple policy, we introduce the use of
optimal holdback levels from two-retailer system as a heuristic
accept/reject policy for the requested retailers in a multi-retailer
system. For this purpose, for each retailer i to respond the
transshipment requests of retailer j, the holdback levels ~xnij are
calculated as if retailers i and j operate in a two-retailer system.
So for a problem instance with M retailers and N periods,
M(M− 1)N holdback levels are obtained by solvingM(M− 1)/2
two-retailer problems and calculating 2N optimal holdback
levels for each two-retailer problem.
A second heuristic policy for the requested retailer’s accept/
reject decision is to always accept the requests. In the literature,
such a policy is generally called as complete pooling or
complete sharing. Complete sharing is optimal in a decentra-
lized setting when all transshipments are done by the end of a
season after all demand is realized and ﬁxed transshipment
prices are used (Hanany et al, 2010) or used as assumption to
simplify the transshipment sending decision (Huang and Sošić,
2010). In our problem setting, as the transshipments are initiated
throughout the season while the full demand realization is not
resolved, a retailer with on-hand inventory has the incentive to
reject requests expecting her inventory to be sold to either the
overﬂowing unsatisﬁed customer or a new customer of her
own in remaining periods. When the optimal accept/reject
policy is not attainable to use, the suboptimal pairwise holdback
levels may lead to an over-conservative transshipment policy
for the requested retailers. Our preliminary numerical analyses
indicate that pairwise holdback levels may lead to losses due
to infrequent use of transshipments compared with centrally
optimal transshipments. Therefore, as a second heuristic accept/
reject policy, we deﬁne an always-accept transshipment request
response behaviour.
In addition to accept/reject decisions, a transshipment policy
in a multi-retailer system should specify a list of possible
requested retailers for each requesting retailer in each period.
The requesting retailer can traverse an ordered list from top
to bottom and continue to ask for a transshipment until a
transshipment request is accepted. Sequencing retailers on the
list is a combinatorial problem even for a static list. Here, we
introduce ﬁve different policies for selecting one retailer to
request from for each transshipment. The heuristic retailer
selection policies we consider make use of information on the
following variables/parameters: xi—the current inventory level
of the retailers, pi—the probability of a customer demand at a
retailer, and si—the salvage price per unit at retailer i at the end
of sales season. While selecting these variables/parameters, we
beneﬁt from the ﬁndings of Çömez et al (2012b), which study a
two-retailer system of decentralized retailers. They show that
the optimal holdback levels of a retailer are nondecreasing in
her salvage price and retailers’ demand probabilities.
The resulting transshipment policies can be classiﬁed in two
groups—heuristics with fully observable and partially observa-
ble requested retailer inventory information. Three heuristics
we introduce belong to the former group and ﬁve of them to
the second one. The policies with fully observable retailer
inventories assume that the requesting retailer has knowledge
about the current inventory levels of the other retailers and
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makes its retailer-to-request decision accordingly. In the second
group, retailer inventories are only partially observable, the
retailers only know whether the other retailer is stocked-out
or not. Below is a brief explanation of each policy and the
possible reasoning of the requesting retailer while choosing this
policy.
First, heuristic policies using pairwise optimal holdback level
for the requested retailer’s respond decision are deﬁned. For the
requested retailer selection, if requested retailers’ inventory
information are fully observable, these information can be used
as follows.
[Max xi | holdback]: Request from the retailer i with highest
inventory level xi. Higher inventory level at the requested
retailer may help to increase the probability of acceptance as
the requested retailer would send a transshipment if her
inventory level is above her holdback level.
[Max xi /pi|holdback]: Request from the retailer i with highest
inventory-demand probability ratio xi/pi. The retailer with
highest inventory wrt the demand rate may not be able to sell
all the inventory and will have lower holdback levels due to
lower demand probability. Therefore she will be more willing
to accept the transshipment request.
Policies with partially observable requested retailer inventory
information and the pairwise optimal holdback level using
requested retailers are deﬁned as follows.
[Min pi|holdback]: Request from the retailer which has the
lowest demand probability pi. The requested retailer will be
willing to transship if there is less probability of selling
the product to the customers, so the optimal holdback levels
of the requested retailer may be lower with low demand
probability.
[Min si|holdback]: Request from the retailer i with smallest
salvage price si. The retailer, which has the lowest salvage price,
can have lower holdback levels, so can be willing to transship
the product as this retailer will earn the least amount of money
from the salvage sales at the end of the season.
[Random i|holdback]: Request from any one of the retailers
with on-hand inventory by choosing arbitrarily. When the
retailers in the system are not much different from each other
and/or the stock-out retailer does not have much information on
other retailers, then he can ask for a transshipment by randomly
choosing a retailer with on-hand inventory. Here, the requesting
retailer does not even need to know which retailers have on-
hand inventory, but he can continue contacting other retailers in
a random order until he ﬁnds a retailer who is not out of stock to
make an ofﬁcial request.
The holdback level-based transshipment request responding
policy is replaced by the always-accept policy in some of the
heuristics above to see whether changing the respond policy
may improve the performance of the heuristic. Thus, we deﬁned
and tested three additional heuristic policies.
[Max xi|always]: Request from the retailer i with highest
inventory xi.
[Min si|always]: Request from the retailer i with smallest
salvage price si.
[Random i|always]: Request from any one of the retailers
with on-hand inventory by choosing arbitrarily.
In each of the heuristic policies introduced above,Rnij deﬁned
in (8), can be redeﬁned accordingly. For example, for the
heuristic [Max xi/pi|holdback],
Rnij ¼
1 if i ¼ argmaxm2PðxÞ xm=pm;
0 otherwise:
(
A heuristic policy can be executed as follows. If the retailers
have fully observable inventory information about the other
retailers, they use one of the policies in the ﬁrst group.
Otherwise they use a policy from the second group. Stocked-
out retailer j selects retailer i from a list of retailers with
inventory, according to the selection criteria of the chosen
policy. Depending on the request respond policy, retailer i
accepts the request either always or if her current inventory
level xi is above her pairwise optimal holdback level against
retailer j in that period. If the requested retailer rejects the
request, the customer demand may overﬂow to another retailer
(including the requested retailer i) or may get lost. The
requesting retailer can make only one transshipment request in
a single period. The relaxation of this assumption to a second
request before the demand overﬂow is discussed as an exten-
sion in Section 5.3. Section 5 analyses the performance of the
heuristic policies introduced above. Note that we also intro-
duced and tested several other heuristic policies such as
[Max xi/θi∣holdback], [Max xi/si∣holdback], [Max pi∣holdback],
and [Min θi∣holdback], but the performances of all of these
policies are signiﬁcantly dominated by the policies deﬁned
above. Thus, we neglected reporting the results of these
alternative policies.
5. Numerical tests of the approximate heuristic policy
performances
In this section, we ﬁrst test the performance of the ﬁrst heuristic
[Max xi|holdback] wrt the self-optimal solution in Section 5.1.
We show that the equilibrium solution with the heuristic
transshipment policy may result in a higher total proﬁt than the
equilibrium solution with the self-optimal transshipments,
which is quite counter-intuitive. Thus, in Section 5.2, we test
the performance of eight different heuristic transshipment
policies wrt the centrally optimal transshipments. Section 5.3
includes discussions on two different extensions of the pre-
viously introduced heuristic policies. Throughout all numerical
tests, the number of periods in a season is set as N= 30.
5.1. Self-optimal versus approximate heuristic policies
We ﬁrst compare the performance of one of the heuristic
policies [Max xi|holdback] to the self-optimal transshipment
policy under their respective equilibrium ordering levels. We
select this heuristic for comparison, because the use of self-
optimal transshipment policy implicitly assumes that retailer
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inventories are fully observed, which is also the case in [Max xi|
holdback] heuristic. As detailed in Section 3, the computation
time for obtaining the expected proﬁts under self-optimal
transshipments increases signiﬁcantly with the number of
retailers in the system. This is because ﬁrst, for each stocked-
out retailer’s requested retailer choice all possible retailers as
well as their rational accept/reject decisions should be consid-
ered. Moreover, to obtain the equilibrium ordering quantities,
the expected proﬁts under each possible ordering quantity set
should be computed and best response functions should be
obtained. We make the comparison in a 5-retailer system as the
computation time for a larger system increases extensively.
Table 1 contains comparisons between self-optimal and
heuristic solutions for 32 problem instances. The base para-
meter setting is such that pi= 0.15, si= 6, c= 6.5, t= 7.5, r= 8,
τ= 0.15, and θi= 0.2, for i= {1, 2,…, 5}. For each problem
instance in the table, only the parameter that has changed from
the base setting is reported. For example, in the ﬁrst setting,
all parameters are at their base levels, except p1= 0.05.
Q* and Qh denote the vectors of equilibrium beginning of
season ordering levels at ﬁve retailers under self-optimal and
heuristic transshipment policies, respectively. There may exist
multiple equilibria in some of the problem instances, but we
report one of these equilibria solutions in Table 1. The table
also reports the optimal order levels of retailers by ignoring
transshipments and demand overﬂow, which reduces the
problem of each retailer to a newsboy setting. The vector of
these order levels is denoted by Q0. Our purpose by calculating
and reporting these optimal newsboy order levels is to conclude
whether considering transshipments and also the transshipment
policy selected change the order level decisions of retailers.
Ji
* and Ji
h denote the expected proﬁts of retailer i at the
equilibrium order quantity under the self-optimal and the [Max
xi∣holdback] heuristic transshipment policies, respectively. The
per cent decrease in the total expected proﬁts of retailers by
using the heuristic policy wrt self-optimal policy is denoted by
ΔTJ*h such that
ΔTJ*h ¼
P5
i¼1 J
*
i -
P5
i¼1 J
h
i
 
P5
i¼1 J
*
i *100
:
According to Table 1, the heuristic transshipment policy for
multiple retailers provides equilibrium proﬁts up to 5.16%
lower than those under self-optimal transshipments when si =
5.6 and all other parameters are at their base levels. At this
setting, the equilibrium ordering levels with self-optimal
and heuristic transshipment policies are Q*= (6, 5, 5, 5, 5)
and Qh= (6, 5, 5, 6, 6), respectively. The optimal ordering
levels for the no-transshipment, no-overﬂow setting are
Q0= (5, 5, 5, 5, 5).
Interestingly, in some problem instances, total proﬁts
obtained with the heuristic are higher than total self-optimal
proﬁts, which are reported in bold letters in Table 1. Although
being interesting, this result is not unexpected for a game
setting. Optimal transshipment decisions help a retailer beneﬁt
optimally from other retailers. The other retailers may also
optimize their transshipment decisions. Thus when all retailers
use their self-optimal transshipment policies, the net beneﬁt of
Table 1 Performance of heuristic policy [Max xi| holdback] over self-optimal policy
Q* Qh Q0 ΔTJ*h(%) Q* Qh Q0 ΔTJ*h(%)
p1 t
0.05 (2, 6, 6, 6, 6) (2, 6, 6, 6, 6) (2, 6, 6, 6, 6) − 0.07 6.9 (6, 5, 5, 5, 5) (6, 5, 5, 5, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) 1.02
0.15 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) − 0.05 7.2 (6, 5, 5, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) 2.87
0.25 (9, 6, 6, 6, 6) (10, 6, 6, 6, 6) (9, 6, 6, 6, 6) 1.33 7.5 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) − 0.05
0.35 (12, 6, 6, 6, 6) (13, 6, 6, 6, 6) (13, 6, 6, 6, 6) 1.17 7.8 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (7, 6, 6, 6, 7) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) 3.15
s1 r
5.2 (5, 6, 6, 6, 6) (4, 6, 7, 7, 7) (5, 6, 6, 6, 6) 2.42 7.65 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) –0.07
5.6 (5, 6, 6, 6, 6) (5, 6, 6, 6, 7) (5, 6, 6, 6, 6) 1.67 8 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05
6 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05 8.35 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.04
6.4 (8, 6, 6, 6, 6) (10, 6, 6, 6, 6) (8, 6, 6, 6, 6) 1.38 8.7 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.03
si τ
5.2 (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) (6, 5, 5, 5, 5) (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) 3.15 0.05 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) 6, 6, 6, 6, 6) 6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.02
5.6 (6, 5, 5, 5, 5) (6, 5, 5, 6, 6) (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) 5.16 0.15 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05
6 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6,6, 6) –0.05 0.25 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.08
6.4 (7, 7, 7, 7, 7) (8, 8, 8, 8, 8) (8, 8, 8, 8, 8) 1.37 0.35 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (7, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) 1.40
c θi
6.1 (8, 8, 8, 8, 8) (8, 8, 8, 8, 8) (8, 8, 8, 8, 8) 0.00 0 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05
6.5 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05 0.05 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05
6.9 (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) (6, 5, 5, 5, 5) (5, 5, 5, 5, 5) 2.86 0.1 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05
7.4 (5, 4, 4, 4, 5) (5, 4, 4, 4, 5) (3, 3, 3, 3, 3) –0.34 0.2 (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) (6, 6, 6, 6, 6) –0.05
Base setting has pi= 0.15, si= 6, c= 6.5, t= 7.5, r= 8, τ= 0.15, and θi=0.2, for i= {1, 2,…, 5}
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transshipments for a retailer can be low and can even be less
than the case where all retailers use suboptimal transshipment
decisions. This phenomenon is a realization of the Braess’s
paradox. Non-cooperative equilibria in a game are generally
Pareto inefﬁcient, that is, one player could be better off without
anyone else being worse off. When more resources (eg, optimal
transshipment policies) are provided to players of the game,
the inefﬁciency of the equilibrium results in decreases in
performance (eg, equilibrium proﬁt); see Korilis et al (1999).
In Table 1, for 18 problem instances total proﬁt of retailers is
higher under heuristic transshipments. Moreover, in 16 of these
instances, each of ﬁve retailers is better-off when retailers use
heuristic transshipment policy.
Table 1 shows that in general, the equilibrium ordering
levels with heuristic transshipment policy [Max xi∣holdback]
and self-optimal transshipments and optimal order levels for
no-transshipment, no-demand overﬂow system are similar,
despite sometimes higher equilibrium order levels resulting in
heuristic transshipment system. Similarity among Q0, Qh, and
Q* indicates that use of transshipment and/or the transshipment
policy used do not have signiﬁcant impact on the equilibrium
inventory levels of retailers. The slight impact of transshipments
on retailers’ choice of ordering levels is also indicated by
several past studies such as Grahovac and Chakravarty (2001),
Zhao et al (2005), Zhang (2005), and Çömez et al (2012a). This
conclusion is in fact important in terms of our computational
analyses. As stated above, computation time requirement to
obtain equilibrium ordering levels increases extensively with
the number of retailers in the system. The low impact of
transshipment usage on the choice of ordering levels rationa-
lizes the use of optimal order levels from a no-transshipment
system in a transshipment system without much harm, which is
the case in Section 5.2.
5.2. System-optimal versus approximate heuristic policies
Shown that the proﬁts obtained through the use of a heuristic
transshipment policy may exceed those obtained by using self-
optimal policy, in following we evaluate the performance of
the various heuristic transshipment policies we introduce by
comparing to the total expected system proﬁts under centrally
optimal transshipments. Although the structure of the optimal
transshipments policy even for a centrally managed system is
not easy to deﬁne because of the dependence of a transshipment
decision on complete system state (Archibald, 2007; Çömez
et al, 2012a), we can calculate the resulting expected proﬁts for
a given problem instance. Moreover, we also evaluate the
expected proﬁts under no transshipments, which is also called
no pooling, so that decrease in payoffs due to the use of
heuristic transshipment policy can be compared with the loss
due to no use of transshipments that can be regarded as an
extreme transshipment policy.
To isolate the effects of different initial inventory levels, we
use the same beginning of season ordering levels with heuristic
and centrally optimal transshipment policies for a given
problem instance. For this purpose, we obtain the optimal
ordering level of each retailer by ignoring transshipments and
demand overﬂow, which reduces the problem of a retailer to a
newsboy setting as deﬁned in Section 5.1. Besides, by setting
the ordering levels, computation time to obtain the expected
proﬁts under any transshipment policy reduces to a reasonable
amount. Thus, setting the beginning of season ordering levels
according to optimal newsboy quantities helps us both to focus
on transshipment policy performances for comparison and also
to conduct more numerical exercises by shortening the compu-
tation time signiﬁcantly.
We conduct tests for multi-retailer systems from 3 retailers
up to 10 retailers, M= {3, 4,…, 10}. For each retailer system
with M retailers, 350 problem instances are run. For each
problem instance of an M-retailer system, ﬁrst, the beginning
of season ordering levels are calculated by regarding each
retailer as a newsboy and the optimal newsboy order quantities
are obtained. Then, the total expected proﬁt of retailers is
obtained in each of the cases when centrally optimal transship-
ments, no transshipments, or each one of the eight heuristic
transshipment policies deﬁned in Section 4 are used. The total
expected proﬁt with centrally optimal transshipments is denoted
by TJC. The total expected proﬁt of retailers when transship-
ments are managed by a heuristic policy is denoted by TJ h.
Then the per cent decrease in total expected proﬁt of a centrally
managed system by the use of heuristic policy h is denoted by
ΔTJh such that
ΔTJh ¼ ðTJ
C -TJhÞ
TJC
100:
In addition to the total expected proﬁt, the distribution of
the expected demand satisfaction method is calculated for
each problem instance and transshipment method used. The
total expected demand of the retailers over a sales season is
N*∑i= 1M pi. Depending on the transshipment policy used, some
part of this total expected demand will be satisﬁed from direct
retailer stock (S), some by transshipments (T), some by retailer
stock after demand overﬂow (F), and the rest will be lost (L),
such that S+T+F+L=N*∑i= 1M pi. Then per cent of expected
demand to be satisﬁed directly from stock, by transshipments,
from stock after overﬂowed, and lost are denoted, respectively
by S, T, F, and L%, where they sum up to 100%.
For the parameter selection, we inspired from the car retailing
industry considering the well-known application of transship-
ments among car dealers. We take the selling price of a car as
the base parameter and set the purchase price c, salvage price s,
and transshipment price t relative to r. First, we set the relation
between the selling price and purchase price by r=αc, where
α denotes the proﬁt margin added to the purchase price.
According to Autos.com (2013) the average proﬁt margin for a
vehicle is between 6 and 9%, which can increase to 15% for
luxury cars. During numerical analyses α is selected from a
range of [1.05, 1.25] indicating proﬁt margins between 5 and
25%. For the salvage price, we deﬁne si= δir, where 1− δi
denotes the discount rate on the selling price r to salvage the
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end of season inventory. Smartmoney.com (2013) reports
various discount rates on ten 2010 car models according to the
time that a car sits on the lot. The discount rate ranges from 5%
off up to 21%. They add that end of year discounts can go up
to 35%. In following, we let δi to change within [0.65, 0.8],
which indicates a discount rate between 20 and 35% off. Next,
we assume that the transshipment price is also determined as a
discounted function of the selling price such that t= βr and
1− β is the discount rate to send a transship. By deﬁnition
t⩾θir + θisi should satisfy, otherwise retailer i does not accept
any transshipment request. The discount rate applied for
transshipping should not be greater than the salvage discount,
so that it can be proﬁtable for the requested retailer to send her
unit inventory as a transshipment instead of salvaging. Thus,
β is selected from the range [0.9, 0.95] that indicates a
transshipment price obtained by a discount rate between 5 and
10% on the selling price.
Regarding the transportation cost τ, we contacted a few car
shipping companies to get quotes for transshipping a mid-size
car among two cities approximately 200 miles apart. The
average quote was around $300. If we take the average selling
price r of a new mid-size economy level car to be r= $20 000,
we arrive at a ratio of r/τ= 200/3. During the numerical
analyses, wlog, we scale r and change it within [6, 10] with an
average of 8. We change τ between 0.05 and 0.2 with the
average value of 0.125, which is around 8 × (3/200)= 0.12.
To measure the sensitivity of results to system parameters,
for each problem instance, we set some of the parameters to
some certain values and generate the rest of the parameters
randomly from continuous Uniform distributions with the
ranges explained above and summarized in Table 2. For the
same ﬁxed parameters, we generate 10 problem instances, in
each of which the remaining parameters are randomly gener-
ated. Thus, by taking the average of performance measures over
each of 10 problem instances, we indicate the average perfor-
mance under these ﬁxed parameters. By this way, the effect of
the ﬁxed parameters on heuristic performances can be evaluated
more rigorously by eliminating the effects of other parameters.
We ﬁrst compare the distributions of how expected demand
is satisﬁed among different transshipment policies. For this
purpose, in an M-retailer system, the average per cent of
expected demand to be satisﬁed from retailers’ stock (for direct
and overﬂowed customer demand) (S+F)%, by transshipments
T%, and lost L% are calculated for 350 problem instances under
each of the different transshipment policies. Detailed numerical
results on (S+F), T, and L% for all transhipment policies (for
M equal to 3 to 10) are available in the online companion.
Figures 1 and 2 show that as the number of retailers
increases, the percentage of transshipments in total demand
satisfaction increases and sales from stock percentage
decreases. This shows that retailers rely more on transshipments
in larger systems. The result is intuitive as the system gets larger
and the total average expected demand is assumed to be
constant, the expected demand per retailer decreases. This
causes the stocking levels at each retailer to decrease as well.
Then the demand and supply match for each retailer becomes
more challenging. Thus, this results in more often use of
transshipments as an emergency demand satisfaction activity.
Moreover, the lost sales percentage L% also increases with the
number of retailers as the difﬁculty in demand satisfaction
increases in the overall as shown by Figure 3. Note that in all
these ﬁgures, always-transship heuristics are represented by
dashed lines.
Table 2 Distributions of randomly generated parameters.
p0= 1−∑i= 1M pi and i= {1, 2,…,M}
pi U(0, 1/M) δi U(0.65, 0.80) α U(1.05, 1.25) β U(0.90, 0.95)
r U(6, 10) τ U(0.05, 0.20) θi U(0, 1/M)
Figure 1 The change in average T% versus M.
Figure 2 The change in average (S+F)% versus M.
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Policies using holdback levels show slightly higher lost
sales than the always-tranship heuristics. Thus, always-tranship
policies result in closer lost sales percentages to centrally
optimal policies than the holdback level policies. Also note that
all heuristics having always-transship respond policy lead to
the same lost sales percentages, because independent of how
to choose the requested retailer with inventory on-hand, a
requested retailer will always send transshipments. Therefore,
as long as there is inventory in the system, there will not be any
lost sales regardless of requesting decision. The lower lost sales
amounts with always-tranship policies are expected as when a
transhipment request is rejected due to the holdback level, there
is a possibility that the demand will be lost.
Heuristics that always tranship have higher transhipment
percentages T% as expected, but holdback level policies have
closer T% to centrally optimal transshipments. As shown by
Figures 1 and 2, in the overall, while the holdback level-based
heuristics lead to lower transshipment usage than the centrally
managed policy for smaller retailer systems, in larger systems,
they utilize transshipments at least as much as the centralized
one. The reason is that as the number of retailers increases
in the system, there is a higher chance to obtain transship-
ments for retailers using heuristic policies. This is mainly
due to lower pair-wise optimal holdback levels in larger
systems where each retailer has a lower expected demand. In
cases with 3–9 retailers, heuristics [Max xi∣holdback] and
[Max xi/pi∣holdback] have the closest transshipment percen-
tages to that of centrally optimal solution. In the 10-retailer
case, [Min si|holdback] results in the closest transhipment
amount. On the other hand, compared with centrally optimal
transshipments, with holdback heuristic policies a larger
portion of the total demand is directly satisﬁed from stock
% (S +F) in small systems (3–5 retailers), but this portion is
below that of centrally optimal policy in larger systems. This
result directly follows as a consequence of higher utilization of
transshipments with holdback level policies compared with
the centralized one in larger systems.
Next, we report the average, maximum, and standard devia-
tion of the per cent gap in the expected proﬁts between the
centrally optimal transshipment policy and each of the eight
heuristic policies, as well as the no-transshipment policy
denoted by ΔTJh through Table 3 and Figure 4. In Table 3, we
also report the range of the total expected proﬁt with centrally
optimal transshipments TJC for each M-retailer system over
350 problem instances. Note that this range is very similar
for different number of retailers. The total expected demand
for each M-retailer system in each setting is ∑i=1M E(pi)=
∑i= 1M 1/(2M)= 1/2. Here the expected demand for each retailer
in an M-retailer system is E(pi)= 1/(2M), which follows from
the Uniform distribution of pi in the range U(0, 1/M) as reported
in Table 2. Thus, as the total expected demand potentials in
different size retail systems are the same, the ranges of the total
proﬁts with centrally optimal transshipments TJ C are similar.
In addition to comparing the average, maximum, and
standard deviation of the gap between the centrally optimal
transshipment policy and the eight heuristic policies, for each
M-retailer system, paired t-tests have been performed using
350 problem instances to compare the gaps ΔTJh provided by
various heuristics. For each heuristic policy pair of hi and hj,
the null hypothesis is H0 : ΔTJhi -ΔTJhj ¼ 0: When the
null hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis
H1 :ΔTJhi -ΔTJhj ≠ 0 is accepted. Thus the hypothesis tests
whether the difference in mean gaps, thus performances, of
heuristics i and j are statistically signiﬁcant or not. The p-value
of a t-test resulted lower than 0.05 indicates that the null
hypothesis is rejected, that is, compared heuristics’ perfor-
mances are signiﬁcantly different. p-values for all comparisons
in each M-retailer system are reported in Table 4 for
M= {3,…, 10}.
First, we observe that although the maximum is not mono-
tone in M, the average per cent proﬁt gap increases with the
number of retailers in the system. Despite not being monotone,
the standard deviation of ΔTJh also tends to increase with the
size of the system.
Table 3 and Figure 4 show that [Max xi|holdback] and [Max
xi/pi|holdback] are among the best performing heuristics for
3–9 retailer systems. When the number of retailers increases to
10, [Min si|holdback] policy performs better than these two
heuristics according to the average gap in Table 3, but its
performance is not statistically different from that of [Max xi|
holdback] according to Table 4. When we consider the
transhipment percentage %T and averageΔTJh results together,
we see that heuristics which have transhipment percentages
closer to central optimal perform better than other heuristics in
general.
When requested retailer inventories are only partially
observable, policies [Min si|holdback] and [Min si∣always]
perform among the best. According to the average gap,
when the number of retailers in the system is between 3 and 5,
[Min si∣always] performs better than [Min si∣holdback],
which is vice versa for 6- to 10-retailer systems. When the
differences in gaps are compared, it seems that although the
Figure 3 The change in average L% versus M.
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performance of [Min si∣always] is not signiﬁcantly different
than the performance of [Min si∣holdback] in 3–6 retailer
systems, [Min si∣holdback] performs statistically better than all
other partially observable policies in 7-, 8-, and 10-retailer
systems. Relying on p-values in Table 4, [Random∣holdback]
heuristic is performing signiﬁcantly better than [Min pi∣holdback]
in all systems, except 9 and 10 retailers, where the performance
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore we can
conclude that when there is no information about xi or si,
selecting the retailer to ask for transhipment randomly is a better
policy than using demand rates for selection.
Although the heuristics with always-accept respond policy
perform even better than some of the holdback level-based
policies on average when the number of retailers is small, as the
number of retailers increases, they perform poorly. For exam-
ple, according to Table 4, for the 3-retailer system, all always-
accept respond policy heuristics perform statistically signiﬁ-
cantly better than [Min pi∣holdback] policy. On the other hand,
for 10-retailer system, all holdback level-based policies’ perfor-
mances are statistically better than the performances of all
Table 3 Average, maximum and standard deviation of ΔTJh
Transhipment policy Avg ΔTJh Max ΔTJh Std ΔTJh Avg ΔTJh Max ΔTJh Std ΔTJh Avg ΔTJh Max ΔTJh Std ΔTJh
M= 3, TJC= [0.8, 40] M= 4, TJ C= [1.6, 39.9] M= 5, TJ C= [0.4, 38.6]
[Max xi-h] 0.74 8.65 0.85 0.87 5.75 0.71 0.96 5.27 0.82
[Max xi/pi-h] 0.72 8.60 0.84 0.86 5.17 0.76 0.93 5.54 0.89
[Min pi-h] 1.17 8.98 0.93 1.60 5.81 1.01 1.81 7.78 1.24
[Min si-h] 1.00 8.71 0.91 1.29 5.83 0.86 1.47 6.28 1.05
[Random-h] 1.05 8.84 0.88 1.38 5.98 0.84 1.58 6.19 0.99
[Max xi-a] 0.88 8.65 1.31 1.34 13.16 1.87 1.68 18.36 2.20
[Min si-a] 0.76 9.27 1.47 1.16 13.83 2.15 1.46 18.45 2.51
[Random-a] 0.91 9.05 1.39 1.43 13.96 2.01 1.79 18.76 2.31
No transhipment 10.29 34.99 4.58 14.04 38.04 5.47 17.24 40.54 5.87
M= 6, TJ C= [0.8, 33.4] M= 7, TJ C= [0.8, 39.3] M= 8, TJ C= [0.6, 40.5]
[Max xi-h] 1.16 9.85 0.94 1.34 5.48 1.03 1.53 6.05 1.16
[Max xi/pi-h] 1.17 7.56 1.00 1.34 5.37 1.08 1.56 7.50 1.28
[Min pi-h] 2.05 8.67 1.43 2.08 7.33 1.39 2.16 8.39 1.46
[Min si-h] 1.63 7.60 1.11 1.61 6.07 1.15 1.68 6.69 1.22
[Random-h] 1.82 9.94 1.17 1.93 6.67 1.20 2.07 6.36 1.24
[Max xi-a] 2.22 23.28 2.73 2.70 24.82 3.29 3.15 27.86 4.01
[Min si-a] 1.90 23.68 3.14 2.19 26.58 3.77 2.58 27.51 4.49
[Random-a] 2.33 23.80 2.86 2.77 25.62 3.41 3.20 27.86 4.12
No transhipment 20.41 44.50 6.39 22.61 54.38 6.81 25.67 67.71 7.55
M= 9, TJ C= [0.4, 34.6] M= 10, TJC= [0.8, 36.5]
[Max xi-h] 1.66 6.61 1.22 1.81 8.92 1.32
[Max xi/pi-h] 1.73 8.80 1.41 1.91 6.89 1.53
[Min pi-h] 2.29 8.85 1.67 2.31 13.15 1.74
[Min si-h] 1.76 7.66 1.27 1.73 9.06 1.29
[Random-h] 2.24 7.91 1.41 2.29 8.95 1.47
[Max xi-a] 3.25 30.10 4.13 4.02 25.10 4.79
[Min si-a] 2.57 31.32 4.58 3.36 25.75 5.28
[Random-a] 3.28 30.10 4.19 4.06 25.10 4.83
No transhipment 28.38 55.56 7.52 31.07 56.05 8.22
Figure 4 The change in average ΔTJ versus M.
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Table 4 p-values for the paired t-tests conducted to pairwise compare the performances of heuristic transshipment policies
[Min pi-h] [Max xi-h] [Min si-h] No
trans.
[Random-a] [Max xi-a] [Min si-a] [Random-h] [Min pi-h] [Max xi-h] [Min si-h] No
trans.
[Random-a] [Max xi-a] [Min si-a] [Random-h]
M=3 retailers M= 4 retailers
[Max xi/pi-h] 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
[Min pi-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.00
[Max xi-h] 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
[Min si-h] 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.66 0.35 0.00
No trans. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Random-a] 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.70
[Max xi-a] 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.76
[Min si-a] 0.00 0.12
M=5 retailers M= 6 retailers
[Max xi/pi-h] 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min pi-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.38 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.48 0.00
[Max xi-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min si-h] 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00
No trans. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Random-a] 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.01
[Max xi-a] 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.02
[Min si-a] 0.47 0.70
M=7 retailers M= 7 retailers
[Max xi/pi-h] 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min pi-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.01
[Max xi-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min si-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No trans. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Random-a] 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
[Max xi-a] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min si-a] 0.27 0.06
M=9 retailers M= 10 retailers
[Max xi/pi-h] 0.00 0.02 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min pi-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65
[Max xi-h] 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min si-h] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No trans. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Random-a] 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00
[Max xi-a] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[Min si-a] 0.23 0.00
If a p-value is smaller than 0.01, it is reported as 0.00.
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always-accept policies. The maximum ΔTJh and standard
deviation of ΔTJh are higher in always-transship heuristics
even for smaller systems. Although lost sales percentage is
lower in always-transship strategies, this gain does not result in
smaller ΔTJs as seen in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that ΔTJ with no-transhipment policy
increases signiﬁcantly as the number of retailers increases. On
the other hand, the differences between the performance of
no-transshipment and all other heuristic policies are statistically
signiﬁcantly different in all M-retailer systems. This result
conﬁrms the importance of using transshipments, especially as
the number of retailers increases. We can conclude that in
general it is better for the retailers to compute the pairwise
optimal holdback levels and use as a transshipment respond
policy. However, if they cannot, it is better to always tranship
rather than making no transshipments at all.
Next, we investigate the sensitivity of the proﬁt gap wrt the
system parameters individually. Recall that for a ﬁxed para-
meter, we generate 10 problem instances, in each of which the
remaining parameters are randomly generated according to
Table 2. Then the average of proﬁt gaps over these 10 problem
instances indicates the average performance under this ﬁxed
parameter. Thus, in Table 5, each number indicates the average
value over 10 instances. The conclusions regarding the sensi-
tivity analyses are drawn from all retailer systems including
3-10 retailers, but the results are reported only for seven retailers
in Table 5 due to the space limitations. The sensitivity results
for 3- and 10-retailer systems are given in the online companion
for a benchmark.
In general, the sensitivity results do not show strictly
monotone behaviours with the change in the ﬁxed parameter
and among all retailer systems. This is mainly due to the setting
that to increase rigour at each ﬁxed value of a parameter,
10 problem instances are generated where all other parameters
are randomly selected. Thus, the average gap at a ﬁxed
parameter also includes the randomality factor for other para-
meters. However, results indicate certain sensitivity directions
for some of the parameters.
Firstly, as δi increases, the performances of always-tranship
policies improve for 3- to 9-retailer systems. Increase in δi
means increase in salvage price si. With higher si, newsboy
stocking levels are set to higher values, which results in higher
from stock demand satisfaction rates as indicated by Table 5.
Thus, the way that transshipments are granted get similar in
always-tranship and centrally managed systems.
On the other hand, when β increases, which indicates an
increase in transshipment price t, holdback level-based policies
perform closer to the centrally optimal policy. When transship-
ment price is higher, pairwise optimal holdback levels tend to
decrease as transshipments become more proﬁtable (Çömez
et al, 2012b). Thus, more transshipments are granted with
holdback level-based policies approaching the transshipment
amounts in the centrally managed system. Note that transship-
ment decisions are independent of transshipment price with
both central optimal and always-tranship policies.
The proﬁt margin α is another variable that shows consider-
able effect on the performance of always-tranship policies. As α
increases, the purchase price c decreases, so the initial inventory
levels increase and always-tranship policies perform better in
general. Table 5 shows that with the increase in α, the demand
satisfaction directly from stock increases as a result of higher
initial inventory levels. Thus, similar to the effect of increasing
δi, the use of transshipments under always-transship policies
approaches to that under central optimal policy.
The results in Table 5 indicate a few more points. One is that
for α= 1.05, always-accept policies perform poorly wrt other
policies. This leads the average performance of these policies
to decrease to a level notably lower than [Max xi/pi∣holdback]
and [Max xi∣holdback]. In fact, for most of the instances,
[Min si∣always] is the best performing heuristic policy. Second,
policies [Min pi∣holdback], [Random∣holdback], and [Random∣
always] do not prove to be the best performing in any of the
instances. However, the average performances of these last two
heuristics, in which requested retailer is selected randomly
among all with on-hand inventory, are highly close to those
where requested selection requires information gathering. We
believe this result is notable for multi-retailer transshipment
policy studies, as to our knowledge, the performance of random
selection methods are not even considered for discussion in the
transshipment literature before.
5.3. Further extensions of heuristic policies
As illustrated by Figure 4, although always-accept respond
policies manage transshipments similar to holdback level-based
respond policies up to six retailers, for seven or more retailer
systems most of always-accept policies perform signiﬁcantly
poorer than holdback level policies. On the other hand, using
the inventory level information for the requesting retailer
selection results in better performance compared with the case
when the inventories are partially observable and selection is
based on retailer characteristics other than inventory level.
Overall, [Max xi∣holdback] and [Max xi/pi∣holdback] policies
perform quite well among all tested to manage transshipments
close to centrally optimal transshipment decisions. Given that
using holdback level-based respond policy behave well and
known that requested retailers base their respond decisions on
holdback levels in this policy, it might be rational for the
requesting retailer to consider holdback levels of other retailers
in her requested retailer choice as well.
For this purpose, we extend [Max xi/pi∣holdback] policy to
include potential requested retailers’ holdback levels in the re-
quested retailer selection. A new policy [Max (xi− holdbackij)/
pi∣holdback] is introduced such that requesting retailer j selects
the requested retailer i in period n, which has the highest ratio
of the difference between her current inventory level (xi) and
the holdback level that she will use against retailer j (holdbackij)
to her demand rate pi. Retailers that are not willing or cannot
send a transshipment to the stocked-out retailer j would have
non-positive ratio. Thus, by searching the highest ratio, retailer j
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Table 5 Sensitivity analysis—M= 7 retailer system
Parameter Value Central optimal ΔTJh
S% T% F% L% [Max xi-h] [Max xi/pi-h] [Min pi-h] [Min si-h] [Random-h] [Max xi-a] [Min si-a] [Random-a] No transhipment
∑p 0.4 59.19 20.74 1.33 18.73 1.94 1.94 2.20 1.14 2.20 2.79 1.18 2.45 30.23
0.5 67.47 21.10 0.69 10.74 1.69 1.69 2.50 1.77 2.50 2.33 1.06 2.15 26.01
0.6 69.93 19.62 0.95 9.49 1.34 1.34 2.11 1.63 2.11 1.45 0.60 1.44 23.94
0.7 61.07 11.76 3.51 23.66 1.09 1.09 1.36 1.35 1.36 2.78 2.76 2.99 21.15
0.8 72.69 12.71 1.94 12.66 1.08 1.08 1.73 1.58 1.73 1.72 1.32 1.87 19.62
δi 0.60 50.69 16.50 1.48 31.32 0.61 0.59 1.06 1.08 1.08 2.68 2.88 2.88 29.81
0.65 50.82 14.13 1.84 33.20 0.40 0.34 0.88 0.92 0.92 2.67 2.89 2.89 23.65
0.70 55.21 15.32 1.37 28.11 0.58 0.44 1.43 1.37 1.37 2.12 2.35 2.35 27.21
0.75 70.38 13.65 1.15 14.82 0.45 0.37 1.05 1.10 1.10 1.44 1.65 1.65 17.86
0.80 71.80 12.32 1.38 14.50 0.68 0.66 1.75 1.60 1.60 1.18 1.46 1.46 19.29
τ 0.05 59.82 19.76 1.13 19.29 1.15 1.05 1.95 1.51 1.79 1.16 0.49 1.09 26.44
0.10 61.96 18.64 0.93 18.46 1.08 1.09 2.37 2.13 2.06 1.37 1.06 1.51 26.19
0.15 64.73 13.87 1.97 19.43 1.37 1.89 2.30 1.31 1.85 3.55 3.20 3.95 23.28
0.20 54.88 18.14 1.38 25.61 1.40 1.74 2.31 1.92 2.08 5.59 5.62 6.05 25.81
0.25 68.96 14.82 1.76 14.46 1.58 1.81 2.61 1.86 2.18 4.02 3.92 4.43 19.83
β 0.86 63.48 14.85 1.61 20.06 3.03 3.18 4.91 3.89 4.36 2.65 2.01 2.63 21.13
0.88 52.41 13.37 2.66 31.55 1.90 1.53 3.75 3.06 3.08 3.56 3.42 3.69 24.92
0.90 75.96 17.20 0.46 6.38 1.92 2.11 3.15 2.31 2.91 1.84 0.57 1.82 19.97
0.92 72.32 17.42 0.46 9.81 1.58 1.73 2.66 2.09 2.46 2.40 1.34 2.32 20.81
0.94 62.12 13.93 1.02 22.93 1.24 1.22 1.58 1.10 1.43 2.33 1.66 2.26 23.58
r 6 66.36 16.27 1.17 16.20 2.25 1.95 2.06 1.50 2.20 4.25 2.82 3.86 22.24
7 62.25 17.02 1.25 19.49 1.16 1.32 1.94 1.27 1.73 1.75 1.16 1.89 24.02
8 58.40 14.68 2.36 24.57 1.16 1.07 1.64 1.42 1.61 3.43 3.19 3.57 21.69
9 66.53 17.20 0.95 15.31 1.61 1.22 2.16 2.09 2.35 2.61 1.71 2.47 23.67
10 63.91 16.45 1.13 18.52 1.55 1.49 2.33 1.73 2.26 2.74 1.88 2.76 23.94
α 1.05 31.47 3.71 3.64 61.18 0.47 0.46 0.57 0.55 0.51 10.83 11.54 11.26 23.30
1.10 48.25 11.51 3.28 36.96 0.63 0.59 1.02 0.94 0.88 2.53 3.08 2.88 25.15
1.15 64.81 21.01 0.65 13.52 1.30 1.02 2.71 2.54 2.55 0.84 0.60 0.99 25.97
1.20 72.90 22.66 0.04 4.40 1.71 1.84 2.91 2.39 2.77 1.44 0.19 1.35 24.02
1.25 84.87 14.90 0.00 0.23 2.50 2.59 2.41 0.98 2.34 2.49 0.08 1.84 15.08
∑θ 0.5 58.08 13.43 2.56 25.93 1.26 1.04 1.45 1.21 1.49 3.54 3.32 3.66 21.54
0.6 64.88 12.37 2.49 20.26 1.31 1.40 1.83 1.06 1.62 2.68 2.06 2.74 16.59
0.7 67.67 16.01 0.81 15.51 1.34 1.64 2.31 1.50 1.97 1.68 0.71 1.67 17.21
0.8 65.28 17.86 2.26 14.60 1.54 1.28 1.77 1.29 1.77 1.83 0.90 1.62 18.85
0.9 60.99 14.94 3.89 20.18 0.89 1.26 1.90 1.15 1.43 2.18 2.09 2.52 17.45
Avg. 1.34 1.34 2.08 1.61 1.93 2.70 2.19 2.77 22.61
Max. 3.03 3.18 4.91 3.89 4.36 10.83 11.54 11.26 30.23
Std. 0.58 0.63 0.83 0.66 0.73 1.73 2.03 1.82 3.62
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would guarantee to ask from a retailer who is willing to send a
transshipment, if there is at least one such retailer. This property
was not guaranteed in any of the previous heuristics with
holdback level-based respond policies, but with always-accept
respond policies. Therefore, we expect this new policy to
increase the number of successful transshipment requests, so
the contribution of transshipments in demand satisfaction.
To measure the performance of this extended heuristic, the
heuristic policy is run for the same 350 problem instances for
each M-retailer system used in Section 5.2. We report the
average, maximum, and standard deviation of the per cent gap
in the total expected proﬁts between the centrally optimal trans-
shipment policy and the [Max (xi− holdbackij)/pi∣holdback]
policy. Besides, the per cent of expected demand to be satisﬁed
directly from stock (for direct and overﬂowed customers), by
transshipments, and lost are also calculated. The results are
given in Table 6.
As expected, using this policy utilizes transshipments slightly
more than other holdback level-based respond policies.
Comparing the average gaps listed in Table 6 with those in
Table 3, except the 10-retailer system, [Max (xi− holdbackij)/
pi∣holdback] performs better than all other introduced heuristics.
However, the magnitude of the improvement in the average
performance by this heuristic may not be promising enough to
compensate its additional difﬁculty in implementation com-
pared with other policies introduced. A requesting retailer
needs to observe the inventory levels of all other retailers with
on-hand inventory as well as calculate their holdback levels to
be used against himself. This high computation requirement
in a decentralized system environment may not be so practical
especially without the promise of a signiﬁcant improvement in
proﬁt.
Next, we investigated our assumption of a requested retailer
making only one request per stockout. In practice, a stocked-
out retailer may communicate with several retailers one after
the other until he gets a transshipment request accepted.
To assess the value of considering additional requests for
a rejected retailer, we reanalyse the heuristic policy
[Max xi∣holdback] by allowing a second request option if the
ﬁrst one is rejected. Although allowing multiple requests until
one is accepted is the most realistic case, the additional
improvement in proﬁt that can be provided by a second
request signals the importance of a single-request assumption
used in earlier analyses.
To measure the performance of [Max xi∣holdback] policy,
in which the requesting retailer has the second request option,
if the ﬁrst one is rejected, the heuristic policy is run for the
same 350 problem instances for each M-retailer system used in
Section 5.2. We report the average, maximum, and standard
deviation of the gap with the centrally optimal transshipment
policy in the total expected proﬁts. Besides, the per cent of
expected demand to be satisﬁed directly from stock, by
transshipments, and lost are also calculated and the results are
given in Table 7.
Comparing the proﬁt gaps resulting from using [Max xi∣hold-
back] with two requests per stockout to those with the same
heuristic, but with only one request from Table 3, it is clear that
allowing a second request option is decreasing (in loose terms)
the average, maximum, and standard deviation of the gaps.
This proﬁt improvement can be devoted to the slight increase in
the use of transshipments and the decrease in loss sales.
Besides, it is observed that the demand satisfaction rate directly
from stock for retailer’s own and overﬂowing customers
decreases as well. However, we can claim that the improvement
in the performance of the [Max xi∣holdback] heuristic after
allowing a second request option may not be enough to
compensate the increased difﬁculty in analysing the multiple
transshipment requests for a stockout. Moreover, given that
requested retailers are selected in decreasing order of their
expected willingness to send a transshipment, allowing more
than two requests in case ﬁrst two are rejected may bring
even a smaller marginal improvement over the assumption of
maximum two requests per stockout. Therefore, allowance of
a single transshipment request per stockout seems to be not
restricting for the purpose of comparing performances of
various easy-to-implement transshipment policies. However,
still in practice, any one of the policies introduced by this study
can perform slightly better when retailers spend effort to contact
more than a single other retailer to get a transshipment request
accepted.
Table 7 Performance of heuristic policy [Max xi∣holdback] when
two requests are allowed per stockout over centrally optimal policy
# of retailers Avg Max Std
ΔTJh ΔTJh ΔTJh %S+F %T %L
M= 3 0.70 8.65 0.83 78.95 6.67 14.37
M= 4 0.83 5.68 0.68 74.97 9.18 15.86
M= 5 0.92 5.27 0.77 70.65 11.65 17.71
M= 6 1.14 9.16 0.91 66.72 13.38 19.90
M= 7 1.32 5.15 1.01 64.86 15.24 19.89
M= 8 1.53 6.05 1.16 61.31 16.85 21.84
M= 9 1.65 6.61 1.21 58.85 18.93 22.22
M= 10 1.80 7.29 1.29 53.73 19.63 26.64
Table 6 Performance of heuristic policy [Max (xi − holdbackij)/
pi∣holdback] over centrally optimal policy
# of retailers Avg Max Std
ΔTJh ΔTJh ΔTJh %S+F %T %L
M= 3 0.64 8.61 0.82 78.89 6.76 14.35
M= 4 0.72 5.07 0.66 74.79 9.40 15.80
M= 5 0.79 4.95 0.74 70.35 12.01 17.63
M= 6 1.01 6.60 0.87 66.30 13.89 19.82
M= 7 1.22 4.72 0.98 64.35 15.84 19.80
M= 8 1.43 7.47 1.21 60.67 17.58 21.75
M= 9 1.61 7.58 1.32 58.10 19.79 22.11
M= 10 1.83 6.88 1.48 52.93 20.55 26.53
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6. Conclusion
This paper studies a system of multiple retailers selling the same
product, where the retailer operations are decentralized. Each
retailer is responsible for maximizing his own proﬁt through the
inventory stocking decision at the beginning of the selling
season and demand satisfaction efforts throughout the season.
In this system when a retailer gets stocked-out, he may ask for a
transhipment from other retailers to satisfy a waiting customer
demand. In case of a transhipment need, requesting (stocked-
out) retailer should decide which retailer to request from and
requested retailer should decide on whether to accept the
transhipment request or not. As transshipments among inde-
pendently managed retailers are considered, it becomes more
important that the transshipment policy used is easy-to-exercise,
as transshipments become voluntary activities that are not
imposed by a central agent. In the lack of easy-to-use optimal
policies, many ﬁrms may follow extreme policies such as
either they do not want to commit to use transshipments (called
no sharing) or commit to send transshipment as long as it is
possible (called complete sharing). However, instead of
extreme policies, the introduction of easy-to-use and close-to-
optimal policies can encourage independent retailers to mitigate
supply-demand match through the use of transshipments.
Therefore, we introduce heuristic transhipment policies for
selecting the retailer to request from and for making the
accept/reject decision. Thus, we develop several heuristic
transhipment policies and compare their performances with
self-optimal and centrally optimal policy.
Firstly, we show that when all retailers use heuristic tranship-
ment policies, the total retailer pay-offs may be more than that
when they use self-optimal transhipment policies. In other
words, using a heuristic policy may result in higher total
expected proﬁt and better individual proﬁts for all retailers.
This is a realization of the Braess’s paradox, which explains
how equilibrium solution may move to a more efﬁcient result
when non-optimal actions are taken by players of a game
instead of self-optimal ones. The result is important to comment
on the general intuition that heuristic methods are inferior to
optimal solutions. When retailers are in fact competitors due to
demand overﬂow and their stocking decisions form an inventory
game, their use of self-optimal transshipment policies may result
in an equilibrium stocking solution that is inferior to the one under
heuristic transshipment policies. Given that computing optimal
transhipment decisions depends on the complete system state and
is challenging to use in practice and shown that self-optimal
transshipment policies may be even inferior to heuristic policies,
then the need for the introduction of good heuristic policies and
their use in practice are clearly underlined by this study.
We develop ﬁve different heuristic policies for the decision
of selecting the retailer to ask for transhipment. These heuristic
policies can be classiﬁed into two according to the availability
of inventory level information on others: fully observable
policies where the retailers know the inventory levels of others
and partially observable policies where the requesting retailer
knows which retailers have stock on-hand but not the exact
amounts. We use two different policies for the transhipment
accept/reject decision: always-accept and pairwise optimal
holdback levels. Always-accept is an extreme policy that
retailers do not always prefer. Pairwise optimal holdback levels
are obtained by considering a two-retailer system of only the
requesting and requested retailer such that requested retailer
accepts to send a transshipment if her inventory level at the time
of the request is above her holdback level. We compare a total
of eight policy combinations with the centrally optimal policy
over 3- to 10-retailer systems.
The results show that retailers rely more on transhipment as
the number of retailers in the system increases. In fewer-retailer
systems, using holdback level policies results in a larger portion
of the total demand directly satisﬁed from stock relative to
central optimal policy. In larger systems, this percentage falls
behind that of centrally optimal system. The average proﬁt gap
increases with the system size. However, the proﬁt loss due to a
no transshipment policy is even much higher.
In terms of transshipment request respond decision, always-
accept policies result in lower lost sales and higher transhipment
rate but holdback policies have closer transhipment rate to
that of centrally optimal system. Heuristics with transhipment
amounts closer to that of centrally optimal policy perform better
in almost all cases in terms of total system proﬁts.
In terms of transshipment requesting decision, if the
inventory levels are fully observable, [Max xi∣holdback] and
[Max xi/pi∣holdback] are better performing policies considering
total system proﬁts. If the inventory is partially observable,
[Min si∣holdback] is a good policy. One suprising result is
that random selection policy performs better than some other
policies
From a managerial point of view, there are several key
ﬁndings of this study that can be important for the practice of
transshipments in decentralized and multi-retailer systems. One
is that retailers can be better off by using heuristic transshipment
policies instead of self-optimal in terms of both practicality and
also proﬁts contrary to the general belief. Second, although the
performance of heuristic policies is in general poorer in large
systems compared with small systems, but retailers are far better
off using heuristic policies in larger systems compared with
the extreme policy of not using any 26 transshipments. Third,
when retailers are allowed to access others’ inventory state
information, it is better to select the requested retailer with
higher inventory level expecting a higher chance of a request to
get accepted. More interestingly, it is shown that if there is no
information about inventory level or salvage prices of others,
retailers are better off if they randomly select the retailer to
request from. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
study to analyse the performance of random retailer selection as
a transshipment requesting policy, although a random selection
process is probably highly practiced in industry when there
is no systematic support is available. Forth, comparison of
alwaysaccept and holdback policies show that when the system
is small, always-accept policies often work better. Holdback
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policies perform better in larger systems. Thus, in small
systems, always-accept policy can provide good enough prac-
tice instead of computing holdback levels.
In the overall, these ﬁndings, which are quite novel in the
literature, mainly support many of the rational, but analytically
unproved applications of the industry. They provide a promis-
ing basis for heuristic, but practical applications of transship-
ments in large systems when ﬁnding and applying optimal
solutions have quite complex requirements.
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